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The Polarity Fallacy 
Marcus G. Singer 
In the preceding pa.per "'Polar Terms and lmerdependenc Concepc:," I accempted 
an elucidation of the concept of polar terms, and, indirecrly chereb ·. of what is 
often called polarity. I argued that there are at lease rhree differenr conceptions 
of polar terms, which I termed conceptual, existential, and episcemic. and 
defined as follows: 
(a) Definition of "concepcually polar": A and B are polar iff the meaning of 
one involves the meaning of che other. 
(a') Explication of cancepcually polar: A and B are concepcually polar iff 
neither A nor B can be defined, explicated, understood, or conceived of withou1 
defining, explaining, understanding, or conceiving of the other, and neirher can 
have a meaning unless the other has a meaning. 
(b) Definition of "existencially polar": A and B are e:xiscentiaUy polar iff it is 
impossible for an instance of one co exist unless there also exists some corre­
sponding instance of the other. 
(c) Definition of "epistemically_polar": A and B are episr.emically_polar iff it is 
impossible for an instance of one to be ascertained, made out, discovered, or 
known without reference to the other. 
It should be evident that the widest concept is conceptual polarity, while the 
strictest and narrowest is existential polarity, and that (b) implies (a) but not 
conversely. If two terms are existentially polar then they are conceptually polar; 
but terms can be conceptually polar without being existentially polar. Further, 
(c) implies (a) but not conversely. That is to say, if two terms are epistemically 
polar they must be conceptually polar, but not vice-versa. Yet there is a fairly 
widespread tendency - and one not peculiar co people altogether unfamiliar 
with philosophical discussions - to first, not notice the distinction, and second, 
as a consequence, to suppose that if two terms or concepts are polar then in 
order for an instance of one to exist, or to be made out or ascertained, there 
must exist an instance of the other. This is a fallacy which I hereby dub the 
polarity fallacy. 
This fallacy is exemplified by Max Black's claim that "peace" and "war" are 
polar terms, while defining "polar words" as terms so related chat 1'it is impossible 
for an instance of one co exist unless some corresponding instance of the other 
also exists", which implies that it is impossible for a state of peace to exist 
without there also existing a state of war.1 I t  seems very likely (though I will not 
here take the trouble to explore the matter) that it is also exemplified in a work 
by Norman Malcolm, in which he observes, inter alia, that 
Certain words of our language operate in pairs, e.g., "large" 
and small", "animate" and 11inanimate", "vague" and "clear'\ 14Certain" 
and "probable". ln their use in ordinary language a member of a 
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pair reqwr<!s_n opP<Y•te - for ammate is cc.mtrasted with 
inammace. probabilicv wnh certainrv, vat!Ueness with cle�rness.= 
�d the fallacy lS alS<.l exemplified in che amcle m ''The Ineffable" m Tiu: �clopedui of Plulosoph�, where it is said that ... Fom1' and 'content' ... are polar 
concepts; wherever there is form chere muse be conrenc".' This holds only if 
eropriness, or norhing, is alk)\\'ed ro count as conrenr. Come 
�k w Black for a moment. Black �ay· (op. cit., p. 46) chac .. Every stuff 
muse have some shape. and every hape muse be che ,hape of somelhing, Le! . •  of 
5()11'1e maceriaJ or kmd of material." Bur chis confuses pocenrialiry ,,;ch accualiry. 
There is no necessity for every shape co be the shape of an <u:nu1l_something - a 
gi,•en shape can be solely an abstraction. and not actually che shape of anything. 
thac is, anything accual, and chat means anything existing. So chere is no 
enstential polarity here, only conceptual. Black adds: "The pair of rerms 'shape' 
and 'stuff ' resemble such pairs as 'husband' and 'wife' or 'north' and 'south' ". 
Thac is true if the resemblance meant is conceptual polarity, not true if the 
resemblance is thought of as existential polarity. "Husband" and hwite" and 
"north" and "south" are exist(!ntially polar - the latter pair is indeed the 
paradigm case - "shape" and "stuff" arc nor. 
Lacey's Dictionary of Philosophy defines ''polar concepts" as follows: 
Concepts which allegedly only have application if their opposites have 
application, e.g., good and evil, if it is rrue chat there could be noching 
good in the universe unless there were something evil for it to contrast 
with, and vice versa.,. 
Lacey, it is true, does not actually commit the polarity fallacy; noce his use of 
"allegedly" and his saying "if it is true ... " Others, however, Jo, and the example 
Lacey uses is a prime case. Here is an example in which che fallacy is accually 
committed: 
... all our cognitive experiences are based on conrrasc. Without 
darkness, we should noc be able to understand what light is. If there 
were no such thing in exiscence as slavery, or imposition. or necessiry, 
then the idea of freedom would have no meaning, would nm exisc .... 
Generally speaking, nothing can become an object of our cognitive 
experience i( not contrasted with its opposite. Thus we can formulate 
the first principle determining reasoning in the following way: No 
concept, no judgment, no unit of thought has any meaning or logical 
value without ics opposite, or, in other words, No units of thought 
exist and function otherwise than in pairs of opposites . ... 5 
The idea that no unit of thought has any meaning without its opposite is in my 
judgment false, since I regard it as so dubious chac every unit of thought must 
have an opposite, as our author believes. Bue that is noc the concern here. The 
concern here is the polarity fallacy, which is not the idea that every idea has its 
polar opposite (though chat is a worthy candidate for a similar title) but che 
inference that, because two ideas are so related that the meaning of one involves 
the meaning of the other, there cannot exist an instance of one unless there also 
exists an instance of the other. So we are told that unless there were slavery 
there could be no freedom, which is happily false. If we were merely being told 
3
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thac we could nm have the idea of freedom unit!-. \\ � had ch� 1Jc:a ot �la, t>f"\ � • 
necessity. etc.), that would be unexcepnonable. bur unim:ert.> tlnJ:!. \X'� c.in ha· .• 
the idea of slavery without there being laverv. and 1c 15 a good thing t� . 
· 
Otherwise we should have to regarJ C}Tanmcal or la\'e cace.., a reallv cc.mcnhi·. 
ing to human good, since they provide us w1th che 1Jea of tTe�Jnm. which ""°'11:l 
be unavailable without them. In pomt of fact, lave states have ex�ccJ, have 
existed recently, and stilJ exist ro<lay, and there ha\'e been cenccr· of freedom 
existing in the nudst of or surrounded by centers of slaven·. But we are here 
dealing with logic and concepcuaJ po ibilicy, not with hisconcal development. 
We need models of good, we do nor need models of evil We can imagine them, 
and that is enough. 
Here is another example: 
... polarity means balance. And while each partner needs the ocher for 
its fullest development, yet each contributes something more Lr\ their 
union than the full development of the other; each adds some giift of 
its own not implicit in the partner .... 
Can eirher then exist wlwll1 apart from the other, exist if the other 
does not exist? No. If it could, there would be no intrinsic or essential 
polariry in the siruacion. Take . . .  the case of the two hands. One 
hand, to be sure, may remain when the ocher is cut off; even so. the 
nerves in the amput:aced limb testify co che former presence of the 
latter, and the movements of the other are to an extent determined 
by what the lost member was accustomed to do. The influence 
persists as a guiding factor in the behavior of the remaining organ . . . .  
The polarity, still present - one hand so to speak wants the other -
has to that degree become a lost ideal.. . .  6 
There are a number of interesting ideas here. as there are in the book from 
which the passage is taken, but what is especially interesting in this context is 
that the passage commits the polarity fallacy. It is claimed that neither of two 
polar ideas can "exist wholly apart from the other". If I understand this at all, 
and I think I do, I understand it to mean at lease that neither of two polar ideas 
can exist unless they both exist. This as we have already seen is false. To come 
back to hands, consider the situation of someone born wirh one hand missing. 
Here there has been no amputation, hence no "nerves in the amputated limb 
testifying to the former presence of the latter". Certainly it is better to have two 
hands than only one (and it might be even better to have three or four, though 
testimony on this is mixed), and there is no doubt a sense or a way in which each 
hand requires the other. This does not mean that if one hand has been ampu, 
tated the amputated hand exists latently, since no longer actually, any more than 
it means that if one hand has been amputated the other is latently or potentially 
amputated, that it can no longer reaUy exist or function since its partner no 
longer really exists or functions. Imagine a person with (in two senses) an 
amputated hand preserving the amputated hand in a special container which the 
person regularly revisits, as a sort of religious ritual, to replenish and preserve the 
functioning and being of the unamputated hand, and you have a picture 
conjured up by the view under consideration. Something here is baroque, all 
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11ghc. and I u·pecc ic LS che rheory char leads co thi. &.1rt of imaginarion. If we 
5hift the example awa · from han�. co something a bit handier. the point should 
� e';ren more endenc. 
As alread ' argued. two cem\S or concepts (I am noc now talking about things 
.Jready m existence) can be polar - rhe meaning of one can iO\'\.)lve che 
meaning of the ocher in rhe .ense explained in a' above - without n being 
oecessary chat for an instance of one co exist an instance of che ocher muse also 
exist. But chis account holds for terms or concepts, ideas or relations, and not 
for things already in existence. As Grant (op. cil., note 4.) has com;ncingh· 
shown (pp. 95�8), this is rrue wich "convex" and "concave". Akhough these 
ideas are conceptually polar, there is no necessicy that if one side of something is 
conve x the ocher be concave; as Gram points out, it can be flar, or also convex. 
And the following are some further instances, argued for in "Polar Terms and 
�cerdependenc Concepts"· supply and demand, quesuon and ansuoer, and also 
riaching and learning. There can be a supply of something without there being 
any demand whatever for it, as some entrepreneurs have found out co their 
discomfiture. And as people all over the world have found out and continue co 
find ouc, there can be a demand for something -· food. clothing, shelcer, 
freedom - without there being any supply of ic available. To reply that if chere 
is supply of something there must be a demand for something, even if not for ir, is 
simply famous. And, though nothing can be an answer without there being 
some question it is an answer to ("answer,
, is in this way a relative term). there 
can be questions without answers, that is, correct answers as distinct from 
supposiricious answers. 7 Teachers find out all too early in their careers chat there 
can be teaching without learning; and clearly there can be learning without 
reaching. 
A standard move of undergraduates upon being confronted with the problem 
of evil is to argue that there cannot be anything good without there being 
anything evil, and chat therefore God has created evil. or allowed evil co enter 
che world, so that human beings could by the contrast thus obligingly provided 
know what is good, and thus presumably follow what is good and eschew evil. 
But there is no necessiry for evil to exist in order for us co know what is good. If 
comparison and contrast is necessary, as it may be1 it can be supplied by descrip­
tion or imagination. There is no need, at least on these grounds, for evil to be, 
and the move just described is a paradigm case of the polarity fallacy. Even 
"thinkers", in the Bradleyian sense, have committed this fallacy, continue co do 
so. By the same token, there is no need for there to be instances (as distinct 
from constructed examples) of fallacious reasoning in order for us to recognize, 
and to teach others to recognize, good reasoning. Just so, there is no need for 
evil to be.8 Children get the idea of the boogeyman (defined - and spelled as 
just spelled - in the Random House Dictionary as "an imaginary evil character of 
supernatural powers, esp. a mythical hobgoblin supposed to carry off naughty 
children") even though they never run across him, though they do unfortunately 
run acrosi.Pfople like him, such as people who frighten children by telling them 
�es about the boogeyman. (There is nothing paradoxical about 11The Abomi­
nable Snowman does not exist'\ though it may not be especially comforting -
5
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rhere arc "or� c\.tl chac <lo.) An<l we can han! tht: 1JcJ \'I the '>Upt!ffiHtural _ 
ochc:f'WlSt'. we coulJ nor unJcr tand the Jt:fmmon JU':!-l l!l\'t"n, anJ we <lo -
whether 1c exist" or not. The 1Cuamm L' the "amc "1ch magic - \\c can h.n� 
the 1Jca of magic wichouc t:\'t:r cx�nc:ncm� an auual Cl>nhrmcd m"canct: of H 
and wnhouc ht.:lae' ing chac cherc can ht: an� genuine Ubtancc . Tht;° "aml' roin•l 
apply co polar tdea!t, upcmatural or not. l e  �t.'m clear. chen, w recur co the 
quoranon from Lacey, chac word' or cerm'- or concept can have mcanmg 
w1Ch<>ut having whar Lacey caJlcJ .. applicauon ". Of cour:.e. rh1 · pmnc ha-. h::cn 
known for a long ume. Word can ha,·c meaning wtehouc denocmg, sen�t: 
wichour reference, 1md SIJ u:e1ter =- le 1s only chc: ccrmmology - "ha\'lng appltca­
t1on n - that LS different here. The ame hold true, muums muwrufu1 for polar 
words or terms or concepts. 
[ conclude with a pa�gt! from another DicumwT) of Plulosopli)', rhac l)f Pt:rcr 
Angeles, where the polanry fallacy � accuall) committeJ an<l rht! m1 taken 
conceprion of polancy chac lead ro tr 1s overt and explicit: 
When one member of a polancy lS choughr co exi t, oncological :traru� 
1s usually also affinncd for 1r conrrascing member. Examples: Lighc 
cannot exist w1Chout the cx1 tence of darkne · . Love cannot exisr 
wtthour hacc existing. If goo<l did not exist m reality, then there 
would be no evil. 1 
The first caccmcnr here b rrue: when one member of a polarir:y or polar pair 1 
thought to ex1sc, ex1 tence b "u ually al o affirmed for ir concrascing member". 
Bue rhe examples - rwo of which hould have a cemun familiaricy - show 
nothing. Why cannot lighc exist without <larkne ? We can imagine a world m 
which there is light all over all rhe rime. We might nor be able to make it out or 
realize it if there were no darkncs to contrast it wich. If crue, chis woul.d show 
that light and darkness are epistemically polar, but not chat they are exiscencially 
polar. And why cannot love exisr without hare existing? A world in which 
everyone loved, if not everyone then at least someone, and in which no one 
hated anyone, is surely conceivable. le is true rhat we contrast love and hate, 
and all coo often, as psychologists observe, one merges into or gives way ro the 
ocher. But this is evidence that love and hate are concepcually polar, nor that 
they are polar existencially. •'If good did not exist in reality, then there would be 
no evil"! This sounds very like saying that good is the cause of evil, as one mighc 
say that marriage is the cause of divorce because if there were no marriage there 
could be no divorce. But it is no better than rhe view considered before. I am 
not sure chat the statement actually provided is the one rhe author really 
wanted, since it does not say what is more typically said, that if rhere were no 
evil there could be no good, but it makes no real difference. The statement in 
question ('1If good did not exist in reality, then there would be no evil") is 
equivalent as contrapositive to .. If there is evil, then good must exisr in reality". 
Of course, both do exist, but neither exists necessarily [actually, nothing exists 
necessarily - which is noc equivalent to 0NOTHING exists necessarily"], nor 
does the existence of one require the existence of the other. I have already 
argued and do not chink further argument is needed to show further that rhere is 
no necessary ontological connection between good and evil, whichever is taken 
6
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noc existentially rolar. The uprosicion rhat rhev are in. canriace the polariry 
fallacy. 
Notes 
�tax 81.ick. Cmicul Tlunkn� l2nJ c:J.: �ew Y<.lrk. Pn:nttce-H.tll, Inc .. IQS2). pp. 
2 1  l .  443. -l(i. 
Norman �fakt1lm. "M re anJ OrJman Wf\t-"Ua��". m Tlie Plukuoph' rlf G E 
Moore. c...J. P. A. Schtlpp (E\''aO!>Wn: �<,rthwc tern Umvcmrv. 1942). p. 364. 
W. E. Kenmd:. "The Ineffable". The Encyc�<kt of Pluk1wph�. eJ. PJul EJY.,t.rJ:. 
(New York: The Macmillan Company & Thtc" Free Pres. ...  1967), w1l. 4. p. 183. 
A. R. Lace\, A Ok·uonary of Plulosaph� (New YMk: Charle. Scnbner·� �1fb, 1976). 
p.163. Lacey mes ns authonl)' C. K. Grant, '"Polar Conct>pt� nnJ Mctnf)h\'st al 
Argumcn�"'. Proceedings of the An.swuba:n Sociecy, L VI, 1955-6. 
Bons B. Bogoslav�ky. The T eduuque of Omrrot'eTS')' (Ne" York .. Harcoun Bracl' anJ 
Company. 1928), p. 1 18, with itahQ m origmal <>nutted here. 
W1lmon H. Sheldon, God and Polanry (New Haven. Yale Univcrs1f)' Press. 1954). p. 
675. Sheldon's deflniuon of polanty, for which he <loc not clmm prec1s1on, 1s 
"roughh• as follows ... one or another phase. aspect. rel:uion. cvcnc or �nnty nn<l 11 
counccrpan, each peculiar lo the other alone, us counterpart; the l-Y.'\l up(XlSHC ns 1 1  
were in direction, in way of acnng, yet each capable of fruirful coopernll<lll wuh the 
other, also of opposing. denying or frusmmng ll. h:l\'ln� thus a degree o( inde�n· 
dence and a being of its own, and bc1wccn the two n trcnJ or lure to cooper.mun m 
which one of the partners cakes the initiative and the llthcr responds, yet each 
frcdy ... The definition may be 1llustrateJ wuh a fair dcwce of prc i.smn by man's two 
hands, these forming a natural pair ... " (p. 674). Sheldon adds (p. 675) thnt '"the 
very meaning of p<>lariry (is) co pem1ic :l \•arying Jegrce of independence nnd even oi 
correspondence ... and this means some looseness ... precision is chc idol of the 
exclusive intdlcct ... ' I hope I have nm misreprescnccd Sheldon in 1he passage 
used in che ccxt. Thac is certainly a po ibiliry. le would appear from the definition 
just reproduced chat polaricy on his account 1s deAne<l as existential, since he is 
calking or means to be calking about reality. "The pairing principle", he says, 
"pervades reality". His emphasis is metaphysical; mine 1s logical. I poim out only 
chat metaphysics is, or oughc to be, subordinate m logic. Bue perhl'tps metaphysics 
and logic ar,e related in polar fashion. l( so, on which conception of polnrir.y? 
Here is a nic.e example just come to hand: "Some questions, even though 
rhey can never be answered, consumt:ly recur, and deserve attention. 
That is true of a question I have been askeJ repeatedly since Dalla:.: Would 
Kennedy have handled Vietnam the same way Johnson did? Obviously. hiscory doc� 
nor allow us co cest such alccmatives; one must rely on one's instincts" (Clnrk 
Clifford, wim Richard Holbrooke, "Serving the President", The Neu.1 YorlceT, April 1 ,  
1991. p. 73). Other examples arc easily supplied. It might be 1hought that all that 
this passage illustrates is a question char we cannot answer. to which, in other worJs, 
the answer cannot be known, but from che fact that the answer to a given question 
cannor be known it does not follow chat there is no right answer. The logic here is 
sound, but the topic is large, so I content myself here merely with pointing out that 
the question quoted is quite different in fom1 from such a question as "Was it Lee 
Harvey Oswald acting alone who killed John F. Kennedy, or was Kennedy killed by 7
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� tl.sc, Of' W3.S rhttc a COl"b,ptran !• Tim laucr �Udtx'lf'\ � cannot re 
answ•ered wu:h c.crnuncv since che enden� � become: :.e> talc anJ the -tucsuvn 
has become so polmaz.cd. Yet dearly there 15 a nghc ansuc:r. c:\·en t�>UJ!h v.c: 
cannot �·er � what ll iA. Thu � po1m. that th<:re clearh 15 a nght a�c:r. ti. 
noc so obo.10US with respect w countcrfuctual 4u�su()ru about hbtonccll m.Jrtcr�. 
I am grateful to Gcor� Dicker for persuadmg me. a> he did I dunk uncoruc1�lv, 
that tlu.s pant abooc the polant)' faJlaq was v.-orth making separately, especially m 
rdaaon to cht ideas of good and evil, ouu1de che unmedtate context of ·Polar 
T emu and lnccr<kpcncknc Conccpu ... 
Peter Angdcs, Druonary of Plulosophy (New York: Barnes & �oble, 1981 ) ,  p. 2 1 5. 
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